

**Confederate Strategy in 1863: Was a Strategic Concentration
Possible?**

MONOGRAPH
BY
Major D. Jonathan White
United States Army



**SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS**

Academic Year 1999-2000

20010515 060

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)			2. REPORT DATE 15 May 2000	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED monograph
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Confederate Strategy in 1863: Was a Strategic Concentration Possible?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Maj D. Jonathan White, USA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) see attached				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 64	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	

Abstract

Confederate Strategy in 1863: Was a Strategic Concentration Possible?

By Major D. Jonathan White, 55 pages.

The National Military Strategy outlines the U.S. military concept for winning two nearly simultaneous Major Theaters of War: concentrate in one, shift assets to the second, and win the second. The U.S. doctrine calls for the use of decisive force in a concentration against its enemies. Army doctrine supports this concept as well. Army Field Manual 100-5 still includes the idea of concentration under the principle of war of "mass."

The origin of the U.S. military thinking on concentration comes from the beginnings of the Republic. After the Napoleonic Wars, there were two schools of thought: Archduke Charles and Jomini. Archduke Charles' idea called for the distribution of forces *en cordon*. Antoine Jomini advocated distribution as a necessary precursor to concentration. These schools of thought dominated pre-Civil War U.S. Army. The U.S. Army was oriented on a cordon defense. Jefferson Davis, having learned this during his time as the U.S. Secretary of War, attempted to implement a cordon defense when he became the President of the Confederacy.

Other Confederate strategists advocated a Jominian concentration. One of the earliest was P. G. T. Beauregard, who generally suggested a concentration on the Tennessee theater. The Confederacy responded to the crises of 1862 with marginally successful strategic concentrations in Mississippi and Virginia. Throughout the war, Davis countered attempts at formal offensive concentrations with suggestions on a defensive concentrations to shore up threatened sectors.

In the spring of 1863, Robert E. Lee suggested a decisive offensive concentration in Virginia for a campaign in Pennsylvania, which Lee believed could be the decisive campaign of the war. Davis accepted Lee's ideas on the campaign, but did not ensure adequate support for it. Confederacy had forces available before the campaign.

The monograph uses five criteria to evaluate concentrations: distance, time, combat power, leadership, and purpose. The monograph uses these criteria to evaluate the Confederate strategic situation in 1863 and draw some conclusions relevant to modern concentrations.


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major D. Jonathan White

Title of Monograph: *Confederate Strategy in 1863: Was a Strategic Concentration Possible?*

Approved by:




Monograph Director

Dr. Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D.



Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Professor and Director Academic
Affairs, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 15th Day of May 2000

Abstract

Confederate Strategy in 1863: Was a Strategic Concentration Possible?
By Major D. Jonathan White, 55 pages.

The National Military Strategy outlines the U.S. military concept for winning two nearly simultaneous Major Theaters of War: concentrate in one, shift assets to the second, and win the second. The U.S. doctrine calls for the use of decisive force in a concentration against its enemies. Army doctrine supports this concept as well. Army Field Manual 100-5 still includes the idea of concentration under the principle of war of "mass."

The origin of the U.S. military thinking on concentration comes from the beginnings of the Republic. After the Napoleonic Wars, there were two schools of thought: Archduke Charles and Jomini. Archduke Charles' idea called for the distribution of forces *en cordon*. Antoine Jomini advocated distribution as a necessary precursor to concentration. These schools of thought dominated pre-Civil War U.S. Army. The U.S. Army was oriented on a cordon defense. Jefferson Davis, having learned this during his time as the U.S. Secretary of War, attempted to implement a cordon defense when he became the President of the Confederacy.

Other Confederate strategists advocated a Jominian concentration. One of the earliest was P. G. T. Beauregard, who generally suggested a concentration on the Tennessee theater. The Confederacy responded to the crises of 1862 with marginally successful strategic concentrations in Mississippi and Virginia. Throughout the war, Davis countered attempts at form offensive concentrations with suggestions on a defensive concentrations to shore up threatened sectors.

In the spring of 1863, Robert E. Lee suggested a decisive offensive concentration in Virginia for a campaign in Pennsylvania, which Lee believed could be the decisive campaign of the war. Davis accepted Lee's ideas on the campaign, but did not ensure adequate support for it. Confederacy had forces available before the campaign.

The monograph uses five criteria to evaluate concentrations: distance, time, combat power, leadership, and purpose. The monograph uses these criteria to evaluate the Confederate strategic situation in 1863 and draw some conclusions relevant to modern concentrations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Historical Foundations of Concentration	5
III. Development of Confederate Strategy	11
IV. Early Confederate Experience With Concentration	18
V. Confederate Strategic Options in 1863	29
VI. Summary And Conclusion	42
Appendices	47
Endnotes	55
Bibliography	59

Chapter I: Current Concepts of Concentration

“Strategic Agility is the timely concentration, employment, and sustainment of US military power anywhere, at our own initiative, and at a speed and tempo that our adversaries cannot match.”

US National Military Strategy

The concepts of mass and concentration have been central to U.S. military thinking for more than a century. From the beginnings of strategic thought in the United States, the idea of concentration was present. Indeed, Washington’s Yorktown Campaign stands out from his others in the American Revolution in that he abandoned a strategy of exhaustion and switched to one of annihilation. Washington succeeded in concentrating superior force at the decisive time and place when he concentrated against Cornwallis at Yorktown.¹ In this way the colonies won their independence.

The purpose of this monograph is to explore current thinking on mass and concentration of combat power, to critically examine where this thinking came from and how this thinking played out in one case study from American military history. Finally, this monograph draws conclusions on the relevance of the concepts of mass and concentration for the near-term future of the U.S. military.

Current U.S. military thought on mass and concentration comes from and influences U.S. military doctrine. In the hierarchy of U.S. military doctrine, near the top is the National Military Strategy (NMS), written by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The current version, written in 1997 and signed by GEN Shalikashvili, addresses the context of concentration of military forces and mass. The NMS addresses concentration indirectly by stressing the necessity of Strategic Agility and Decisive Force. As stated above, Strategic Agility is “timely concentration, employment and sustainment of US

military power anywhere at our own initiative, and at a speed and tempo our adversaries cannot match.”² Decisive Force is defined as “the commitment of sufficient military power overwhelm an adversary, establish new military conditions, and achieve a political resolution favorable to US national interests.”³

Elsewhere in the same document, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasizes the need for decisive operations. “In situations such as a MTW [Major Theater of War], the Armed Forces must be able to gain the initiative quickly. Our forces must have the capacity to halt an enemy; immediately initiate operations that further reduce his capacity to fight; and mount decisive operations to ensure we defeat him and accomplish our objectives.”⁴

This passage shows how the issues of concentration and initiative are related. It will not avail a commander to concentrate superior force at the decisive place and time if he will not gain and use initiative to take advantage of his concentration. Having concentrated superior force, he must use it with effect against his outnumbered enemy.

Also part of Joint Doctrine is Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines mass as “the concentration of combat power.”⁵ Joint Publication 3-0 says of concentration, “[w]hen required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties.”⁶

Joint doctrine focuses on quick decisive offensive operations because of the current strategic setting of the United States. In supporting the National Security Strategy, the military has the stated requirement of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous

Major Theaters of War (MTWs). This requires winning the first of those “nearly simultaneous” MTWs, then switching assets from the first to the second. This is the reason for the focus on concentration, mass, and quick, decisive victory.

Army doctrinal pronouncements support and underline the joint doctrine on the ideas of mass and concentration. The 1993 version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* defines the relationship between mass, concentration, and centers of gravity as follows: “The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s center of gravity...” and “[d]ecisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are not centers of gravity, they are keys to getting at centers of gravity.”⁷ The Army’s vision of operations calls for the Army to mass combat power at the decisive time and place, to win quickly and then be postured for commitment to other theaters.

This thinking on quick decisive victory is not new to the Army. Starting in 1921, the Army adopted the idea of Principles of War to help guide thinking on warfare.⁸ Concentration has never been a U. S. Army Principle of War, but mass is still among the Army’s Principles of War. In the 1993 edition of Field Manual 100-5, the principle of mass means to “mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.”⁹ Successful adherence to this enables the Army to fulfill its part of the Chairman’s vision of how the U.S. will conduct operations. The Army’s doctrine foresees concentration as a key component of a successful strategy.

Thus, concentration and mass are concepts found throughout current U.S. military thinking. The National Military Strategy outlines why mass and concentration are important. Given a limited amount of military power available and disparate potential

theaters of war, Joint doctrine calls for the US military to concentrate, win quickly and decisively, then shift assets to other theaters as needed. Army doctrine outlines how the Army will support this concept.

While current doctrine addresses whether to concentrate and why, this monograph addresses other questions related to strategic concentration, such as, where to concentrate, with what forces, when. It does so in an historical case study, using the situation that the Confederate strategists faced in the spring and summer of 1863 as a laboratory for developing thoughts on strategic concentration. The American Civil War is useful in that the armies of the time were relatively simple. No air components, relatively little interaction with naval forces, and the fact that organizationally, the opposing armies were mirror images of each other in terms of equipment, doctrine, and organization. Still, answering each of the above questions were critical to the Confederate leadership, but perhaps the most important issue facing the Confederacy was under whose command the concentration should be made.

Chapter II: The Historical Foundations of Concentration.

“When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.”

Napoleon Bonaparte, Maxim XXIX

Le principe fondamental [de la guerre]... consiste à opérer avec le plus grande masse de ses forces, un effort combiné sur le point décisif.” (The fundamental principle of war is to operate with the greatest part

ope

between 1805 and through 1830's, a formative period for American military thinking.

One of the earliest interpreters of the implications of the revolution in military affairs that were the Napoleonic Wars was Archduke Charles. The Archduke published his work, *Principes de la Strategie* in 1818. It was critically acclaimed by American officer Henry Wager Halleck, who later wrote a standard pre-Civil War U.S. Military Academy text on strategy. Thus the ideas of Archduke Charles exerted an influence over the professional development of American officers on both sides of the Civil War.

Archduke Charles' work was ironic in several ways. First, it was ironic that one of the first critical essays attempting to explain Napoleon's success was written by an Austrian. Napoleon had made his name by winning many of his most spectacular and decisive victories against the Austrians. Rivoli, Arcola, Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Wagram were some of the occasions when Napoleon smashed Austrian armies with decisive effect. Napoleon may have found humor in the fact that a soldier of the nation that had been the recipient of these beatings would be one of the prominent early

commentators on Napoleon's career.

More ironic was the Archduke's interpretation of the secret of Napoleon's success. Archduke Charles postulated that Napoleon built his success between 1795 and 1809 on the groundwork of his predecessors in expanding France to stable or "natural" frontiers and then constructing an extensive, well-built, and well-placed line of fortifications to defend their territorial acquisitions. This allowed France during and after the Revolution to wage war against her enemies from secure borders. France, to quote the Archduke, "sustained herself against all Europe; and this was because her government, since the reign of Louis XIII, had continually labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles of strategy."¹¹

Thus Archduke Charles ideas were popular in Europe as the new U.S. Military Academy was developing its curriculum. The currency of Archduke Charles' ideas fit nicely into the existing emphasis on engineering at the US Military Academy. The Academy had its origins as a school of engineering¹² and according to the law of 1802 establishing it as a separate academy, the Chief of the Army's Corps of Engineers was to serve as the Academy's commandant.¹³ Archduke Charles' ideas also had an influence on the curriculum at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point through the person of Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan was an 1824 graduate of USMA who had attended the *Ecole Polytechnique* in France and then studied French border fortifications at a time when Charles ideas were popular in Europe. This emphasis on fixed fortifications fit well with the engineering emphasis of the West Point curriculum. When Mahan returned to West Point and later wrote his book *Outpost* which was published in 1847 and became the standard West Point text on strategy for the cadets who were to become the strategic

thinkers of the Civil War.¹⁴ As such, *Outpost* places great emphasis on fortifications and field works, as useful adjuncts to maneuver: “the spade, implementing the terrain, went hand in hand with the rifle and bayonet.”¹⁵

One final tie between West Point and engineering and fortifications was exemplified in each graduating class. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the top graduates of each West Point Class generally went into the Engineer Corps.¹⁶ The U.S. military of the period relied on states to furnish the balance of the required infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments, which required officers with relatively less-refined skills. Engineer officers, however, could generally not be militia members to be called into federal service in time of crisis. The nation’s needs for defense dictated that the federal army, while small, would devote more of its energies than the militia to designing and building the fortifications in peacetime that would defend the nation in war. In this regard, Charles’ emphasis on fortifications seemed to fit with the West Point’s emphasis engineering and fortifications.

While the engineering emphasis was a guide for the Army as to how best to prepare for war, it also guided how the Army was organized in peacetime. The engineering emphasis of West Point enabled the active Army to support the geographical orientation of the War Department. In both peace and war, the War Department used “departmental command to exercise control over army forces. Departmental command dated back to the earliest days of the republic. Schuyler commanded what was called the Northern Department in June of 1775.¹⁷ Congress named Robert Howe to command the Southern Department in 1777.¹⁸ After the war, the Department of War continued the practice of using department commands to exercise control of the Army’s forces.¹⁹ Eventually, under

Secretary of War Calhoun, the “Northern and Southern” Departments were exchanged for “Eastern” and “Western” Departments with a total of eight commands subordinate to departments called “Districts.” This was essentially the system that Jefferson Davis inherited during his formative time as Secretary of War.²⁰

This use of departmental commands to exercise command and control of U.S. Army forces fit into and reinforced the strategic thinking of Archduke Charles and its emphasis on positional warfare. That is, fortify the strategic points of one’s nation and distribute one’s forces among those fortified places. In the American context, the assigning of active army forces to fixed strategic points allowed these points to serve as bases of maneuver for the militia, which was more oriented to the maneuver forces of the day: infantry and cavalry. This system had two obvious benefits: It allowed each component, both active and militia, to serve in a manner consistent with its perceived nature. In addition, in a relatively frugal period in the history of the Federal government, it was inexpensive. Thus by design or by accident or both, the American military thought was oriented on a strategy reminiscent of Archduke Charles’.

There are several possible critiques of Archduke Charles. First, his theory is not born out by the historical events. If Charles’ ideas were correct in his assertion that natural frontiers were the secret of Napoleon’s early success, then Napoleon’s retreat to the natural frontiers of France in the winter of 1813-1814 would have at least bought him time to rebuild his army, or perhaps even allowed him to stop the Allied offensive. Instead, the Allies paused briefly to invest the major fortifications that French forces still held, and then plunged on into France. Also, if natural frontiers were decisive, then surely the Austrians would have been able to hold Italy in 1796 and 1800. Instead, Italy

fell to Napoleon's armies with seeming ease.

It seems that a more plausible explanation of Napoleon's success is to be found elsewhere. Conveniently, there was another interpretation of Napoleonic warfare that was available which was destined to be more influential than Archduke Charles'.

Starting in 1803, Antoine de Jomini started a series of writings that attempted to explain both Napoleon's campaigns and using them to elucidate eternal laws of warfare.

Between 1806 and 1838, Jomini wrote two major works: *Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires* (1806) and the *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre* (1838). In these works, Jomini distills the essence of warfare to one great jewel, his *principe fondamental de la guerre*: Concentration of the mass of one's forces against the decisive point. This statement has two aspects and two effects. First, it addresses the issue of concentration. This idea was central to Napoleon's strategic and operational thinking, and marks perhaps Napoleon's most significant contribution to the advancement of military thought. It was the idea of concentration that separates Napoleon most strikingly from his predecessors and most of his peers. Second, it speaks to the decisive point. The idea was a not new one,²¹ but one that was also easily grasped by students in light of Napoleon's campaigns.

In its effects, Jomini's *principe fondamental* was easily translated from the French without losing its impact and it was readily understandable. What may have been more important to military thinkers before the Civil War, it was easily supported with examples, especially from the abundant experience of the Napoleonic warfare. Time and time again, Napoleon's army met with success when it was able to concentrate "the mass of its force" against the decisive point. Rivoli, Eylau, the Battle of the Pyramids, and Austerlitz provided students of military history with examples of Jomini's principle in

war in action.

Thus, prior to the start of the Civil War, there existed two schools of thought, not necessarily contradictory, but divergent nevertheless. On one hand, the Archduke Charles school emphasized defensive positions and fortifications. On the other, Antoine Jomini placed greater emphasis on maneuver and concentrating the mass of one's forces against the decisive point of the enemy. The inter-relationship of these two schools was to be the arena in which Civil War strategy would be played out.

Chapter III: The Development of Confederate Strategy.

Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights and promote our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others...

President Jefferson Davis' First Inaugural Address, 1861

In independence we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the states with which we have lately been confederated. All we ask is to be let alone...

President Jefferson Davis
Address to the Confederate Congress, 29 April, 1861²²

The most momentous decision a state can make is how to use the assets at its disposal to ensure the continuation of the state. The Confederate States came into being in the midst of a crisis and had to struggle throughout its existence for survival. The failure of the Confederacy to find and implement a military strategy adequate to that crisis doomed it to extinction.

Certainly a comparison of assets available to the United States and the Confederate States would indicate that the Confederacy, in 1861, faced long odds. In comparing some simple facts, the advantages enjoyed by the United States are impressive. The Union had more than twice the population of the Confederacy (21 million to 9 million) and four times the white population. Admittedly, the Confederacy's refusal to fully access the black population in a military manner was a self-inflicted burden, but a burden very real in its effects on the Confederate war effort. The Union advantage is more pronounced in other areas. In 1860, by value, the 23 northern states produced 20 times as much bar, sheet, and railroad iron as the southern states, thirty-two times as many firearms, and five times the tonnage of ships and boats.²³

These and other advantages enjoyed by the Union did not make Confederate defeat

inevitable. The Confederacy possessed certain advantages of her own. First and most significantly, the Confederacy possessed all the advantages of the defense. The Union had the burden of attacking, conquering and occupying the territory of the Confederacy. Major General Winfield Scott, at the start of the conflict, estimated that conquering the southern states would take two to three years and 300,000 men.²⁴ Certainly, neither the Confederate leadership nor the general populace saw the coming conflict as hopeless until very late in the war.²⁵

The pressing and unavoidable question for President Davis and the new-born Confederate government was to develop a strategy to employ to preserve the Confederacy. In this regard, Davis relied heavily on his earlier experience as the United States' Secretary of War. Davis also continued the U.S. practice of department command. The departmental command system, as it was used by the United States prior to the war, was the United States' way of handling the dispersion of the U.S. Army across the enormous geography of the United States, especially in the era before the telegraph.²⁶ Each area of the United States had been part of a Department. Each department had a commander and his staff and this commander exercised command over all the forces in his department.

The effect of this arrangement was to simplify the job of the Secretary of War and the President in regard to managing the U.S. Army. The department system freed the Secretary of War from the necessity of managing anything except the geographical and functional department commanders and shuffling forces between the geographical departments. The department commanders were relatively free to manage the day to day affairs of their departments.

The adoption by the Confederate States' War Department of the department system caused three problems. First, the assumptions about the environment upon which it was based during Davis' time as the Secretary of War were no longer valid. The sheer size of the forces in the Civil War was a most obvious change. During Davis' tenure as Secretary of War, the Army consisted of around 10,000 men distributed among in seven geographical departments.²⁷ The Confederate Army of December 1861 numbered 258,680, spread among thirteen geographical departments.²⁸ The challenges inherent in maintaining an army of about 10,000 men were vastly different than those of creating an army of a quarter of a million from nothing.

Also, information flowed much faster than during Davis' time as U.S. Secretary of War. The advent and common usage of the telegraph made the flow of information faster and more detailed than it had been when Davis had been the Secretary of War. Thus operational guidance flowed to Department Commanders and responses came back to the War Department much more rapidly than they had prior to 1861. This unleashed an unprecedented dynamic. Prior to the telegraph, the Secretary of War were forced to issue broad guidance and allow commanders in the field the latitude to adapt the guidance to conditions on the ground. Local conditions may be unforeseen in the capital. If guidance was too explicit and peremptory, it might be disastrous if local commanders followed the guidance too rigidly. Before the advent of the telegraph, it was often best to leave the guidance broad and rely on the judgment of local commanders as to how best to implement it.

Finally, and most significantly, the department system supported one side of a debate over the proper use of military forces since the end of the Napoleonic wars. The two of

the most influential writers on and interpreters of Napoleonic warfare in the 1830's, and 1840's. Archduke Charles and Antoine-Henri Jomini both wrote treatises that influenced American strategic thinking before the start of the Civil War. To state the issue simplistically, Archduke Charles favored a more positional form of warfare while Jomini favored a war of movement, using maneuver to gain a positional advantage over the enemy.

This is not to say that either school was absolute in its thinking. Archduke Charles obviously envisioned some maneuver, just as Jomini maintained some geographic essence by the use of the idea of the decisive point. These merely represented opposing points of a continuum between positional and maneuver warfare.

These two thinkers formed the foundation of the strategic thinking on both sides of the Civil War. Indeed, it is possible that the strategic thinkers did not see any conflict between these two schools. Instead of black and white, there were simply shades of gray. If the Confederacy had its positional warriors such as Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston, it also had maneuver warfare advocates such as P. G. T. Beauregard and John Bell Hood. It must be remembered, however, that Joe Johnston concentrated forces at Manassas and Richmond, and Beauregard defended Charleston, South Carolina and Hood defended the strategic point of Atlanta.

On the northern side, the rise of Henry W. Halleck illustrates the same conflict inside the U.S. Army. Halleck, the author of the West Point book on strategy before the war gained the glory for taking Nashville, which fell because of Grant's brilliant maneuver against Forts Henry and Donelson. Likewise, Halleck was credited with winning at Shiloh, which was largely a defensive battle for the United States Army. Instead of

rapidly following up his victory, Halleck undertook slow ponderous siege-like moves against Corinth, in the tradition of Archduke Charles and Dennis Hart Mahan. Slow as the move on Corinth, its success, coming after the victory at Shiloh, was enough to draw Lincoln's attention to Halleck. On July 11, 1862, after consulting Dennis Hart Mahan at West Point, Lincoln named Halleck General-in-Chief of the "whole land forces of the United States."²⁹ In this position, he was able to influence the adoption a strategy based on positional warfare until superceded by Grant in March of 1864.

On the Confederate side, a similar dynamic was taking place. President Davis was, himself, a leading advocate for a positional defense of the Confederacy. First, his training at West Point led him in that way, as did his experience as U.S. Secretary of War. Also, as Chief Executive of the Confederate States, Davis was obligated to answer the concerns of all eleven of the state governors as to how the Confederate government was going to assure the defense of their states. Alabamian Leroy Walker, Davis' first Secretary of War (the first of many), had had no prior experience with the U.S. War Department. Walker seemed to have been selected because he was not one to contradict

th

15

ht a Jominian concentration had to struggle.

In Virginia, for example, the Confederate War Department established six geographic departments in 1861. By way of comparison, after a year of crisis and hard fighting, these six had been consolidated into just two. How this occurred will be related

hereafter.

This forced a dissipation of effort, as department commanders informed the War Department that their department was the most threatened and appealed reinforcements. It also made any theater-wide concentration more difficult because moving forces between departments, in theory required at least some coordination by the War Department in Richmond, if not explicit orders directing such a concentration. Given Davis' experience as Secretary of War of the United States, he was often reluctant to give peremptory orders to any department commander directing him to denude his department of troops in order to concentrate elsewhere. Davis tended to couch guidance on troop transfers between departments in conditional terms or as suggestions "if practicable."

Just as Confederate forces tended to be distributed between many small departments early in the war, the troops within some departments were deployed *en cordon* in small packets. Only one department did not suffer from being too small, the enormous Department Number 2, which stretched from the western slopes of the Appalachians to the Indian Territories. Even there, the Department Commander, Albert Sidney Johnston, had chosen to deploy his relatively small force in penny packets along the Tennessee-Kentucky border.³² At the beginning of February, 1862, just before Grant's winter offensive against the Albert Sidney Johnston, by dispersing his forces along the border, had only 4,500 men in Fort Henry.³³

There is substantial irony in this deployment. A. S. Johnston's deployment seems to indicate favor adherence to Archduke Charles' idea on cordon defense. The irony is that to the extent that Johnston did manage to concentrate his forces, he did so at two relatively unimportant places, Columbus and Bowling Green, Kentucky. Meanwhile,

Johnston left the real strategic point, the neck of land between Forts Henry and Donelson, relatively unprotected. Grant was not long in destroying Johnston's defensive position. Once Henry and Donelson were captured, the Union had river access to the Cumberland to Nashville and the Tennessee to Muscle Shoals. Bowling Green became useless as a position and Columbus became untenable.

This shows the danger of a defense *en cordon* and the value of rapid concentration. The Confederates in general, and Albert Sidney Johnston in particular, had deployed their outnumbered forces *en cordon* and attempted to cover every possible Union contingency. This guaranteed that Confederate forces would be outnumbered in each locale. What is more, in the event of a Union concentration, such as Grant's at Henry and Donelson, the Confederates would be heavily outnumbered.

Chapter IV: Early Confederate Experience with Strategic Concentration

Our means and resources are too much scattered. ...Important strategic points only should be held. All means not necessary to secure these should be concentrated for a heavy blow upon the enemy where we can best assail him. Kentucky is now that point. On the Gulf we should only hold New Orleans, Mobile, and Pensacola; all other points, the whole of Texas and Florida, should be abandoned, and our means there made available for other service. A small loss of property would result from their occupation by the enemy; but our military strength would not be lessened thereby, whilst the enemy would be weakened by dispersion. We could then beat him in detail, instead of the reverse.

Major General Braxton Bragg writing to Confederate Secretary of War,
Judah Benjamin, February 15, 1862

It was in the late winter of 1862 that the conflict between Jominian concentration and a strategy of dispersion arrived at a crisis. Albert Sidney Johnston had distributed his forced *en cordon* along the Kentucky-Tennessee and Arkansas-Missouri borders. Grant had concentrated his forces against the decisive point of the theater: the nexus of Forts Henry and Donelson. The best possible means for the Confederacy to retrieve its situation was to enact a Jominian concentration. Coincidentally, one of Jomini's most ardent American disciples arrived in Tennessee to bring such a concentration to fruition: P. G. T. Beauregard.

Beauregard, having lost favor with President Davis, was transferred to the west and came with visions of redeeming his reputation there.³⁴ Originally Beauregard had foreseen concentrating Polk's Corps at Columbus with Earl Van Dorn's Trans-Mississippi troops for a Confederate offensive aimed at the Union base at Cairo.³⁵ Grant's capture of Henry and Donelson and Polk's abandonment of Columbus rendered such a concentration and offensive impossible.

The loss of middle Tennessee, however, upped the stakes and Davis ordered an

unprecedented concentration of Confederate troops in the vicinity of Corinth, Mississippi for an offensive against Grant. On February 8, 1862, Confederate Secretary of War Judah Benjamin sent a message to Mansfield Lovell, Confederate department commander in New Orleans, in which he directed "the withdrawal [of troops] from points, not in immediate danger" to the more threatened point.³⁶ Lovell was ordered to send 5,000 troops to Johnston, this redeployment stripped Lovell's department of most of its infantry. Braxton Bragg, at Mobile and Pensacola, was directed to move to Johnston's aid with his entire force (16,000 men)³⁷ although he did leave his heavy artillery largely in place to defend Mobile.

With the War Department aware of the extent of the emergency and concentrating forces to try and remedy it, Beauregard also set about assembling the remaining forces of Johnston's Department No. 2. On February 21, 1862, Beauregard invited Earl Van Dorn in Arkansas to cross the Mississippi and come to Beauregard's aid for the purpose of a counter-offensive.³⁸ Johnston made this an order on March 23, and moved almost all the troops in his department east of the Tennessee to the assembly point at Corinth.

This was the first time that the Confederacy had assembled so many troops from such a large area. Ruggles 5,000 troops from New Orleans had come 400 miles by river and 100 by land. Braxton Bragg's men came a similar distance via rail to Corinth from Pensacola and Mobile.³⁹ Albert Sidney Johnston's army came 200 miles by road and rail and Polk's army to Columbus came a similar distance by rail. Van Dorn, invited by Beauregard on February 21⁴⁰ and ordered by Johnston on March 23⁴¹ to come east of the Mississippi River; a distance of 300 miles by river and land. The

resulting concentration brought together some 49,444 men of all arms.⁴² This was to oppose Grant's 44,895.⁴³ Thus, in the first major strategic Confederate concentration of the war, it would seem that Beauregard had succeeded in implementing Jomini's ideas on concentrating the mass of his force against the decisive point.

Events would unfold differently, however. The Confederates would not win at Shiloh. Grant dispatched Lew Wallace's Division to threaten Polk's Corps northwest of Pittsburg Landing, lowering Grant's force there to around 37,000. Beauregard had correctly interpreted this move at the time for the Confederate attack against Grant's isolated and vulnerable army. Johnston and Beauregard attacked on the morning of April 6. Receiving an erroneous report that Don Carlos Buell could not arrive by the next day, Beauregard halted the final attack at dusk of the first day. During the night, Grant received reinforcements in the form Lew Wallace's Division and parts of Don Carlos Buell's army. These reinforcements swelled the Union ranks with 27,000 fresh troops, tipping the scales against Beauregard. The window of opportunity for crushing an isolated Federal army had closed.

There are several positive aspects of the Confederate's Shiloh concentration. First, it was the right place and time to execute. The disparate Confederate forces were either fleeing before larger Federal armies (Johnston's and Polk's armies) or were defending relatively unthreatened sectors (Ruggles & Bragg). Corinth was central to the dispersed Confederate forces. Good rail and river lines of communication facilitated the concentration of the disparate Confederate armies. Halleck had dispersed his army into four large groups: Curtis' force in southwest Missouri, Pope's forces at New Madrid, Grant's at Pittsburg Landing, and Don Carlos

Buell's moving from Nashville to Pittsburg Landing. The dispersal of the Union forces indicated the correct time to attack: as soon after the Confederate concentration as possible, but certainly before Halleck succeeded in completing his own concentration.

Here lies the first critique of the Confederate concentration. It was too slow, too limited in geography, and done under a bizarre command structure. Beauregard stated that he had decided on the place and time for a concentration preparatory to a counter-offensive around February 21. The last of the Shiloh troops arrived in the Corinth vicinity on March 27,⁴⁴ but Johnston did not give the order to advance on Grant's force until April 3 and did not succeed in getting his army into its attack position until the April 6. Too, even though the Confederate concentration had gathered forces from as far away as 400 miles and from three different Departments, Johnston did not succeed in getting all the troops from his own department. McCown had 3,500 men at Island Number 10 and Earl Van Dorn, en route to Corinth with perhaps 10,000 men, did not succeed in getting to Corinth in time to participate.⁴⁵ McCown and Mackall were tying down a substantially larger Union force and defending the Mississippi River fortifications, but Van Dorn, however, was not occupying any corresponding Federal force.

Finally, the Confederate command structure at Shiloh was faulty. Having assembled elements of three departments at or near Corinth. Many of these commanders and units had never worked together and many had never been in combat. Beauregard set about trying to fuse this force into an army capable of offensive operations. This took several critical days and delayed the attack against

Grant.

Also, the direction of the battle was a source of confusion. Johnston, at his arrival at Corinth had informed Beauregard that he wished to cede to Beauregard the direct command of the Confederate armies there assembled.⁴⁶ Beauregard may have been the brain behind the strategic concentration, but his battle plan came under severe criticism as being too complicated for the army of amateurs he had assembled. In particular, his attack in column of corps almost guaranteed confusion once the battle was joined and made sustaining the offensive more difficult.

Thus, the Confederates' first major strategic concentration was a near success, but failed because of critical weaknesses. The time and place of the concentration showed that Beauregard had a grasp of Jominian concentration. The combat power assembled was appropriate as far as it went. Van Dorn's missing 10,000 troops may have changed the outcome of the first day at Shiloh. Finally, having the right commander was a critical weakness. Beauregard had done well in the assembly of the army, but his plan was too complicated and Johnston was not able to overcome this during the fight.

The next major Confederate concentration came a few weeks later and in another theater. On 12 March, McClellan had started to debark troops Fortress Monroe on the southeast end of the Peninsula between the James and York Rivers, with a view of seizing Richmond from that locale. On April 14, 1862, a conference took place in Richmond between President Davis, Secretary of War George W. Randolph, Davis' military adviser R. E. Lee, Army Commander Joe Johnston, Corps Commanders G.W. Smith and James Longstreet. At the conference, Johnston made his recommendation

as to Confederate strategy. In the face of McClellan's invasion, Joseph Johnston had advised the President to allow McClellan's army to advance near to Richmond. The Confederacy could then concentrate resources from all over the eastern seaboard, and McClellan would find at Richmond a Confederate army "quite as numerous"⁴⁷ as his. There, a decisive battle might be fought, away from the aid of Union gunboats and the sanctuary of Fortress Monroe. "Such a victory would decide not only the campaign, but the war...."⁴⁸ wrote Johnston after the war.

Once the Confederate War Department realized the size and seriousness McClellan's Peninsula invasion, Johnston's command was extended over the heretofore independent departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula, making an intra-departmental concentration possible. In reality, however, once Johnston's authority had been extended over Huger's Department at Norfolk and Johnston had ordered it to the Peninsula,⁴⁹ Davis had ordered one of its divisions (Anderson's) and one of its brigades (Branch's) elsewhere.⁵⁰ Thus the benefits of consolidating the numerous departments in Virginia were somewhat mitigated.

As for inter-department concentration. Johnston clearly advocated it and did so on a truly massive scale. He had recommended to Davis that the Confederacy concentrate 130,000 men at Richmond to crush McClellan's army. Indeed, Johnston had advocated the temporary surrendering of Charleston, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia to achieve this massive concentration. The only other attendee at the 14 April conference that had supported Johnston's thoughts had been Gustavus W. Smith. Secretary of War Randolph had opposed giving up Norfolk with its Navy base. Lee, having just come from duty in Charleston, had opposed giving up the port

cities of Charleston and Savannah.

Thus the Confederate strategy in Virginia in April and May 1862 was somewhat self-sabotaged. Davis did not adopt Johnston's recommendation about stripping the other departments of troops to send to Richmond. Instead, Davis ordered Johnston to move the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia to the Peninsula front and assume command there himself. Johnston, convinced of the rightness of his ideas, went to Yorktown, knowing he would eventually fall back to Richmond.⁵¹ The fatal flaw was that his recommended concentration would not have taken place in the interim. When Johnston got fell back to Richmond, he would get no reinforcements. Davis, for his part, indicates that Johnston seemed not to have any concerns with this arrangement since he did not offer his resignation in protest.⁵²

When the time came for Johnston to give the climactic battle in the vicinity of Richmond, he was badly ill-postured. The Battle of Seven Pines pitted around 53,688 Confederates⁵³ against 98,008 Union troops.⁵⁴ What is more, this figure did not include all of the Confederate troops in the Department of Northern Virginia. Jackson's Valley District held 17,000 troops on 31 May 1862. Branch's Brigade and Anderson's Division did not participate. What is more, there were almost no reinforcements from outside the Department of Northern Virginia prior to Seven Pines, despite Johnston's explicit request to Davis at the 14 April conference.

The results of this failure to concentrate were predictable. Even though Johnston did the best he could tactically to concentrate the bulk of his army against a small part of McClellan's army, the odds were not sufficiently in Johnston's favor, even in a narrow tactical sense. South of the Chickahominy River, Johnston's 62,000 soldiers

faced 31,000 Union troops of the III and IV Corps. These odds seem acceptable, even promising, until one considers that they rely on Johnston getting all of his troops into battle and McClellan being unable to reinforce his left wing at all, two questionable assumptions at best. In the end, some few Confederate brigades did achieve some limited tactical success, but this success was short-lived and prohibitively expensive.

Arguably the best outcome of the battle at Seven Pines from the Confederate perspective was the wounding of Joe Johnston himself. He was ultimately replaced by Robert E. Lee. Johnston had been a commander who had neither the confidence of President Davis necessary to assemble the required strategic concentration nor the personality to wield this force if assembled. Lee had neither shortcoming. In the weeks after his assumption of command, he reorganized the command and, more importantly, set in motion the necessary strategic concentration to deliver Richmond from the menace of McClellan's army.

In April, Lee had argued against stripping the North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia of troops for a concentration at Richmond. In June, Lee did just that. Roswell Ripley's Brigade was ordered from Charleston, Alexander Lawton's Brigade came from Savannah, and three brigades from Theophilus Holmes' Department of North Carolina came north. Inside his Department, Lee set about assembling every available unit not already in the immediate vicinity of Richmond. When Lee launched his counter-offensive on 25 June, 1862, the only forces in the department not available for the Seven Days were some cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley. Lee had increased his strength to around 92,000, compared to McClellan's 105,000.⁵⁵

This strategic concentration was sufficient to allow Lee to outnumber McClellan

sole corps north of the Chickahominy 56,000 to 28,000.⁵⁶ Friction and command problems prevented Lee from destroying any large part of McClellan's army,⁵⁷ but he did succeed in pushing McClellan back from Richmond. Indeed, at the end of the Seven Days, McClellan was "crouched under [cover of] his gunboats"⁵⁸ at Harrison's Landing on the James, all thought of capturing Richmond vanished for the moment.⁵⁹

How had this been done? Time, space, combat power, purpose and leadership were the keys to the near success in the Seven Days. First, Lee had taken the time to assemble a large force at Richmond. Admittedly, Jackson's skill in the Valley and McClellan's extreme caution had made the opportunity possible, but Lee deserves credit for seizing that opportunity.

Richmond was also the best place to conduct this counter-offensive. It was in attacking close to Richmond that Lee was able to use the same forces to defend Richmond and attack McClellan's forces. A concentration elsewhere would have had to run the risk of McClellan attacking Richmond while Lee concentrated elsewhere. Also, McClellan was dangerously close to being able to lay siege to Richmond in the classic Vauban sense, which would have made it much more difficult to dislodge him.

The combat power used was perhaps not enough to accomplish the task at hand, but was probably all that was available. The Department of Northern Virginia was stripped of troops. Other departments (the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, and the Department of North Carolina) were also stripped as far as prudent be given existence of large Union contingents in them and U.S. Navy superiority.

Prior to their concentration, the purpose of the troops who were sent to Richmond had been largely passive and defensive. Lawton's, Ripley's, Holmes' commands fit

this category. Even Jackson's command, famous for its celerity and offensive spirit, had assumed a strategically defensive role by June, 1862. It had been so successful as a distraction that too many Union troops were concentrated against it for any other role in the Valley.

Here is the idea that distinguished Lee's leadership from Johnston's: while Johnston had encouraged Jackson's diversionary role in the Valley, Lee sought to turn it to greater advantage. After taking command of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee had conspicuously reinforced Jackson, then ordered him to quietly slip away from the Valley and join the concentration against McClellan. If Jackson moved quickly enough, Lee could enjoy the benefits of Jackson's Valley diversion (i.e. the diversion of 40,000 Union troops away from McClellan) *and* Jackson's presence at Richmond. Johnston, on the other hand, would have enjoyed one or the other, but not both. Jackson's performance during the Seven Days may have proved disappointing, but the operational genius of Jackson's movement to Richmond was Lee's.

To critique the Confederate concentration at Richmond in 1862, this was the right place and time to concentrate the main Confederate army. Richmond was seriously threatened and the idea of Confederate nationhood may not have been able to withstand the resulting loss of prestige, coming as it would have, on the heels of the loss of Nashville and New Orleans. The Confederacy assembled sufficient combat power to accomplish the immediate purpose of ending the threat to Richmond. It failed to concentrate enough to destroy McClellan's army, even though Lee felt McClellan's army "should have been destroyed."⁶⁰ The leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia was the main fault. Lee found many of the division commanders

wanting and banished them to other theaters.⁶¹

By the early summer of 1862, the Confederacy had experienced strategic concentrations in both the western and Virginia theaters. In both cases, the Confederate advocates of Jominian concentrations had used crises in their theaters to cause President Davis to abandon his penchant for dispersed cordon defense in order to concentrate against a critical and vulnerable Union force. In both cases, this concentration consisted of intra-theater and inter-theater movements of troops. Both had achieved some success, although the Richmond concentration had achieved more.

Most importantly, the Confederate concentration had reduced the dispersion of Confederate armies and helped weld the concentrated forces into cohesive tools for employment elsewhere. It is worth noting that the Army of Northern Virginia generally stayed concentrated over the next two years, and achieved great fame. The Army of Tennessee was repeatedly broken up, redistributed, and then re-concentrated, but never achieved the degree of cohesiveness and success that their eastern comrades did. With tested commanders, relatively cohesive armies, and experience with conducting strategic concentrations, the Confederate War Department would face its greatest challenge in the spring of 1863, and its greatest opportunity.

Chapter V. Confederate Strategic Options in 1863.

We must make this campaign an exceedingly active one. Only thus can a weaker country cope with a stronger; it must make up in activity what it lacks in strength. A defensive campaign can only be made successful by taking the aggressive at the proper time. Napoleon never waited for his adversary to become fully prepared, but struck him the first blow.

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson, spring of 1863.⁶²

You ask what should be done to end this exhausting war. We must take the offensive, as you suggest, not by abandoning all other points, however, but by a proper selection of the point of attack—the Yankees themselves tell us where.

Lieutenant General P. G. T. Beauregard, 26 May 1863.⁶³

The campaign of 1863 promised to be the decisive one of the war. Certainly Jackson saw it as such. One main reason for this decisiveness was the evolution of conscription in the Confederate and United States, and the relationship between the two conscription systems. Other reasons were the relative dispersion of Union forces, and the development of an effective Confederate defense, both in terms of creating quality field forces and the ability to shift assets between theaters.

In the initial euphoria of the war, southerners had rushed in great numbers to join the Confederate Army. Many of these men enlisted for 12 months' service. In the spring of 1862, in the midst of the crises of Henry-Donelson, Nashville, and the Peninsula Campaign, these enlistments started to expire. The personnel turbulence would come at a most inconvenient time for the Confederate Army. The Confederate leadership struggled to find a means of holding the units together. Robert E. Lee, writing to the governor of Virginia in the fall of 1861, expressed the following thoughts on how to deal with this issue: "I know of no way of ensuring the reenlistment of our regiments, except by the passage of a law for drafting them 'for the war,' unless they volunteer for that period."⁶⁴

Many Confederate authorities shared Lee's sentiments and, on April 16, 1862, the Confederacy had passed the first conscription act in the nation's history.⁶⁵ This act required the enrollment of all able-bodied men between 18-35 years of age, although it allowed numerous exemptions and a 20 Slave clause, and some "substitution"⁶⁶ under which wealthy citizens could buy a replacement to avoid military service. The Second Conscription Act of September 27, 1862, extended the age of conscription to 18-45 years of age. The Second Act kept substitution, allowed for more exemptions and the selling of "exempt from service" jobs. Indeed, the Second Conscription Act was so successful that the officer in charge of its implementation, John S. Preston, recommended that the operations of the military conscription bureau be suspended.⁶⁷

Even though the military population of the North was four times that of the South, Union authorities had difficulty in filling the needs of the Union Armies in the field. By the spring of 1863, the manpower shortage had become so acute that the Union passed the Enrollment Act of 3d of March, 1863.⁶⁸ This act called for the enrollment of all white men between 20 and 45 years of age.⁶⁹ Even this law, however, did not result in a universal draft. The law initially called for only 300,000 draftees. Thus the Confederates enjoyed some major, but fleeting, advantages over their antagonists: the Confederate conscription law had been in effect for one year, was more universal and effective, but Union law was only starting to operate as the 1863 campaign season approached, and the Union law was more limited in scope.

The effect of this "fleeting advantage" is evident when one compares the strengths of the two armies as a whole. The Confederate Army, in aggregate, was always smaller than the Union Army. In June of 1862, for example, there were 2.18 Union soldiers per

Confederate. By December, that ratio had grown to 2.36. By the summer of 1863, however, the Union advantage, had shrunk. On June 30, 1863, there were only 1.88 Union soldiers for each Confederate.⁷⁰ The above numbers include Union soldiers that were defending northern seacoasts or western frontier forts, so the actual numbers on the battlefield were even closer. Thus, the Confederate strength in the spring of 1863 was the closest to that of the Union. Even though no one knew this for sure at the time, the Confederate strength reached its peak for the entire period of the war in the spring of 1863.

The Union numerical superiority, to state the above conversely, was at its lowest. What is more, the disposition of that Union strength accentuated that weakness. While the Confederate forces had become more concentrated over the course of 1862, the Union disposition after Halleck's victory at Corinth, was relatively dispersed.

One could easily describe the deployment of Union forces in April as *en cordon*. The largest Union field army, the Army of the Potomac had 163,005 men,⁷¹ a figure representing, 24% of the total Union field force. The next largest field army, Grant's Army of the Tennessee, consisted of 130,390 men⁷² (22% of the total Union field armies), but appearances in this case are deceptive. Almost half of Grant's army was out of supporting distance in Tennessee. Thus, Grant's Department really had two separate armies: Grant's 68,000 near Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, and Hurlbut's 62,000 in western Tennessee. Also in the field were Rosecrans' 96,623 (14.6%) and Burnside's Army of the Ohio with 27,754 (4.1%). Other Union departments had packed distributed around large geographic departments such as Banks' Department of the Gulf (47,803 men), Curtis' Department of the Missouri (40,507), Foster's Department of North

Carolina (16,785), Schenck's Middle Department (35,502).⁷³ The last four were very much dispersed within those departments, and thus the overall department numbers are deceptive.

Thus, the Union field Armies, deployed *en cordon*, presented the Confederates with a number of opportunities. Because of the combination of the lead the Confederates had in their manpower mobilization and the relatively dispersed deployment of the Union armies, it was possible that a Confederate concentration could be brought against a Union field army. What is more, a major Union field army could be *outnumbered*, something the Union had avoided heretofore. To take advantage of this, the Confederate Army had to act quickly.

Finally, the Confederates had had some experience and success with concentration during the previous year. In the western theater, the Confederates had developed a concept under which reinforcements when needed were shuttled between Tennessee and Mississippi via the only remaining rail link, through Mobile. To speed the process, the troops in Mobile were first transferred to the threatened sector and replaced with troops from the sector not threatened. Thomas Connally names the practice the pipeline concept. This system was used in December 1862, to shift forces from Tennessee to Vicksburg to oppose Sherman's Chickasaw Bluffs landing, and against in the other direction in April 1863.⁷⁴

There were problems, however. The forces sent from Tennessee to Mississippi left before the battle of Stone's River, but arrived at Vicksburg after the battle of Chickasaw Bluffs, and thus were not available to fight in either battle.⁷⁵ The Confederate authorities were learning from this type of experience, how, when, and where to concentrate and how

best to employ concentrated forces when they arrived.⁷⁶ The Confederate Armies were poised to build on this success in the spring and summer of 1863.

The question most pressing on Confederate strategic decision-makers in the spring of 1863, was where to concentrate. Each school of thought had its advocates. Thomas Connelly asserted that P. G. T. Beauregard was the leader of what he calls the “Western Concentration Bloc.” This informal grouping of Confederate strategic thinkers, throughout the war, had attempted to get the government to conduct a strategic concentration in the west, specifically, in the Nashville to Atlanta corridor. P. G. T. Beauregard suggested such a concentration in May 1863, even though he was no longer in command of the proposed concentration theater.

The strategic reasons for this were sound. First, the Union army in that theater, Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland, was the weakest of the three largest Union field armies. Second, this theater was centrally located between the theaters he proposed give up the forces for the concentration. According to Beauregard’s logic, a concentration of troops from Virginia against Rosecrans would crush his army and allow Bragg to occupy Kentucky and threaten Ohio and “Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri.”⁷⁷ Reinforcement of Tennessee had already been tried, the previous fall, before Bragg’s invasion of Kentucky in September 1862, so procedures for such reinforcement were already familiar to troops in Mississippi. What is more, the rail link between Lee’s troops and Bragg’s was much more direct (via Lynchburg, Knoxville and Chattanooga) than that used by any possible Union reinforcements (via Wheeling, Columbus, Cincinnati, Louisville and Nashville). Thus, the Confederates possessed Jomini’s “interior lines.”

There were, however, substantial problems with the proposed concentration in

Tennessee. First, the Confederate command system was still faulty. The Confederate War Department had created a separate Confederate Department of East Tennessee, in Davis' words, "because of the delay which would attend the transmission of reports and orders if they must needs pass from Southwestern Virginia to Middle Tennessee and thence to Richmond, Va."⁷⁸ This arrangement, however, had sabotaged concerted Confederate efforts in Kentucky the previous fall.⁷⁹ This department still existed, and still confused the theater commander, Joe Johnston in June 1863.⁸⁰ The effect of a distinct Department of East Tennessee would be to make a meaningful concentration in middle Tennessee under Bragg more difficult. Given Johnston's reluctance to take charge of his geographical department, such a concentration would be almost impossible.

Another serious pitfall, although Davis would not admit it at this juncture, was Bragg's incompetence. Davis had heard from Bragg's subordinate commanders that Bragg was unfit for command. Indeed, Davis had dispatched Johnston in February, 1863, to inspect the Army of Tennessee and recommend whether Bragg should be removed from its command. Upon conducting his inspection, Johnston recommended that Bragg be retained. Davis, however, knew that there was severe dissension in the ranks of the Army of Tennessee, hardly promising material for a grand strategic concentration on which the survival of the Confederacy might hang.

Finally and perhaps most damning of all, the opportunity to conduct a strategic concentration in Tennessee had been pre-empted by the Union. On March 16, 1863, the U.S. War Department had ordered Burnside to take the IX Army Corps to Kentucky in anticipation of the spring offensive in middle Tennessee.⁸¹ Confederate scouts were not long in noticing the movement and reporting it to Richmond.⁸² Thus, any Confederate

concentration in Tennessee was already too late. Davis, however, still suggested such a course.⁸³ This was not intended as a strategic concentration with a view to an offensive, but to reduce a perceived imbalance in forces, in other words, to shore up the most threatened position in the Confederate defense. Such a move would have been defensive and reactive in nature, and likely not decisive in a Jominian sense.

Jefferson Davis applied the same methodology later in Mississippi when, in May, it appeared to be the most threatened point. Davis, being educated in the West Point school of positional warfare and the defense of "strategic points," desired a concentration against Grant in Mississippi, once Grant had moved south of Vicksburg. Davis' parochial interests also augmented his own training in this course of action: Davis' plantation was in the proposed theater of operations. Repeatedly in April and May, Secretary Seddon suggested to Lee that he send one or two divisions to Mississippi.⁸⁴

Lee had effective arguments against sending any divisions to Mississippi. Lee correctly asserted that, in terms of inter-theater movements, the Federals had interior lines of communication with Mississippi. Also, in what was perhaps his weakest argument, Lee stated that the summer climate in Mississippi would make operations there impossible for the northern troops.⁸⁵ Events obviously proved Lee utterly wrong in the assessment.

The weather argument, however, may have been Lee's way of hinting at a much stronger argument.⁸⁶ Taking troops from the Confederacy's best army to send them to its weakest commanders was not good policy. Pemberton, the local commander in Mississippi, was not extremely well thought of in the spring of 1863. Johnston, as Davis surely knew, was also not the strongest commander the Confederacy had.

Johnston's relations with Davis had been strained since its beginning. Johnston's tight-lipped treatment of Davis only increased the President's suspicions. In the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, Johnston had retreated to within four miles of Richmond before giving battle, then had mishandled that fight. Since sending Johnston to the Department of the West as the commander of the "Super-Department" over Tennessee, Mississippi and East Tennessee, Johnston had repeatedly displayed a lack of understanding of his role. Davis intended and repeatedly reiterated that Johnston's authority should be over all forces between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. Yet Johnston simply went where he was told, did what he was ordered to do, and sent telegrams to Richmond asking for clarifications as to the limits of his authority.⁸⁷ This was hardly promising materials to be used for such a critical concentration and offensive.

Finally, although Lee did not say it, Vicksburg was a "dead end" operationally for the Union. The guns on its bluffs were ineffective at controlling Union Navy traffic on the river.⁸⁸ Once it fell, Halleck sent messages to Grant showing that he was somewhat at a loss as to what should be Grant's next move after Vicksburg.⁸⁹ Movement across Mississippi into Alabama would move Grant away from his gunboats and river lines of communication and expose his lines of supply to raids like Van Dorn's Holly Springs raid the previous fall, which had forced Grant to fall back on Memphis. Of the three main theaters in the spring of 1863, one could argue that Mississippi was the one in which the Confederates should accept risk, even if it meant the fall of Vicksburg.

Robert E. Lee, meanwhile, sent a counter-proposal to Richmond. Lee argued forcefully for a concentration in the Virginia theater and an offensive there. First, Lee

offered his arguments as to why the theater for the main Confederate effort should not be elsewhere. Lee doubted the sense in sending troops to Mississippi, because of questions on the time required for their movement⁹⁰ and their “application” on arrival.⁹¹ Most frequently, Lee repeatedly referenced the problems he was experiencing in procuring subsistence for his army.⁹² Moving north of the Potomac would allow the army to forage at northern expense.

More importantly, Lee believed that a move north of the Potomac would derange Union plans for the summer. An offensive move on Pennsylvania would instantly stop⁹³ Union plans for offensives in Carolina and Tennessee⁹⁴ and was thus the best way to defend both regions.

Most important of all were Lee’s ideas on the potential decisiveness of a campaign north of the Potomac. Lee hinted that the result of this campaign may have been the end of the war. In a remarkable letter to Jefferson Davis on June 10, 1863, Lee admitted that the strength of the Confederacy was steadily diminishing while that of the Union was growing. The spring of 1863 saw the rise of the “Copperheads” or peace Democrats, in the north. Indeed, Clement Vallandigham, Ohio Democratic gubernatorial candidate and peace Democrat, was arrested and exiled to the Confederacy by Ambrose Burnside. This gave rise to hopes among the Confederates for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Attempting to put the conflict in its political context for his chief executive, Lee suggested that the Confederacy “should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening [its] enemies.”⁹⁵ The Pennsylvania campaign was to play a part in that dividing and weakening.

Around the first of June, Lee confided in BG Armistead L. Long. If events occurred

in accordance with Lee's plans, "the Federal Army, if defeated in a pitched battle, would be seriously disorganized and forced to retreat across the Susquehanna - an event that would ... very likely cause the fall of Washington and the flight of the Federal government."⁹⁶ Finally, Lee's attitude about the coming campaign, is best illustrated by a quote from Harry Heth from Lee on the eve of the Battle of the Wilderness in 1864:

If I could do so -- unfortunately I cannot -- I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe it to be our true policy, notwithstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of *food for this army* gives me more trouble and uneasiness *than every thing else combined*; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead. The legitimate fruits of a victory, if gained in Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped than on our own soil. We would have been in a few days' march of Philadelphia, and the occupation of that city would have given us peace.⁹⁷

Obviously, Lee believed that this campaign could have been the decisive one of the war. Davis, too, hinted that he believed that the invasion of Pennsylvania might be the decisive one of the war. In his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, Davis wrote that if Lee could "defeat the army [of the Potomac in Pennsylvania], the measure of our success would be full."⁹⁸ Davis did not say what a "full" measure of success would mean, but given the frequent conferences between Lee and Davis, the Confederate President likely was at least familiar with Lee's thoughts, if not in agreement with them.

The potential decisiveness of the campaign being understood, one may ask what steps did the various Confederate agencies take to give it the best chance of success. Lee himself took the initial measures for the spring campaign. As early as February, he sent Longstreet and two divisions to North Carolina and southern Virginia primarily to supervise the collection of forage and subsistence for the coming campaign.⁹⁹

In February, Lee asked Jackson to have his cartographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, make a map of the Shenandoah “Valley of Virginia, extended to Harrisburg, Pa. And then on to Philadelphia.” Hotchkiss was enjoined to keep the making of this map, “a profound secret.” In March, Hotchkiss finished the map and gave it to Lee.¹⁰⁰

In April, Lee ensured that 600 feet of pontoon bridging was assembled at Gordonsville.¹⁰¹ This latter fact was interesting in its implications. The Potomac upstream from Great Falls has numerous fords and often does not require bridging except after heavy rains, as Lee knew from the previous fall. The fact that the next closest river requiring that much bridging was the Susquehanna may be an indication of the breadth of Lee’s thinking.

The most important step to ensure the success the campaign, however, was to concentrate a superior force in Virginia. In this regard, the Confederate government failed utterly. The previous winter, the War Department had moved several brigades from Lee to areas with warmer climates in which operations were still feasible. Lee fully expected the return of Ransom’s, John R. Cooke’s and Micah Jenkins’ veteran brigades before the start of the summer campaign season. Governor Zeb Vance, however, intervened with President Davis and the end result was that Lee received the novice brigades of Davis and Johnston Pettigrew. In addition, Lee received two cavalry brigades of rather indifferent quality: Imboden’s and Beverly Robertson’s.¹⁰²

Sending reinforcements to Lee’s army would have been acting to reinforce success, not, as in the case of sending troops to Tennessee or Mississippi, bolstering failure. Lee’s army was more ready than ever to fight and was better postured to make the decisive campaign of the war. Although difficult to measure after the fact, the Army of Northern

Virginia after Chancellorsville possessed the best morale during any part of the war. Numerous Confederate authorities commented on this at the time, including Lee.¹⁰³ Lee's former military secretary, Armistead Long, stated that the Army of Northern Virginia "appeared the best disciplined, the most high-spirited, and enthusiastic army on the continent" and possessed an "almost invincible ardor."¹⁰⁴ The fact that the Army of Northern Virginia possessed such high morale was also observed by their opponents. Two Union officers wrote about the extraordinary *esprit de corps* of the Army of Northern Virginia in that spring.¹⁰⁵

With more reinforcements, Lee may have been in a position to win his decisive battle in Pennsylvania. What is more interesting, significant reinforcements were available. In the Department of North Carolina were the veteran brigades of Cooke, Ransom and Micah Jenkins, all having served in the Army of Northern Virginia before. In addition, were there were other brigades in North Carolina. The transfer of Clingman's and Martin's new brigades, and the veteran brigades of Jenkins, Ransom, and Cooke' would swell the ranks of Lee's infantry by 15,000 men. This would still leave 13,000 men in North Carolina to hold the rail lines from Foster's 16,000 Union troops.¹⁰⁶ If additional 5,000 Confederates were transferred from the troublesome Department of East Tennessee (half the infantry in that department),¹⁰⁷ then 20,000 could have been added to the Army of Northern Virginia just prior to what Lee and President Davis hoped would be the decisive campaign of the war.

Instead, Davis succumbed to the strong-willed and usually uncooperative Zeb Vance and the potential for a decisive concentration slipped past unused. It is worth noting two facts. First, in battles in which the Confederate forces outnumbered Union ones

(admittedly, a rare occurrence), only Pea Ridge was a Union victory. In Chickamauga, a cobbled together Confederate force under a rather weak commander was able to heavily defeat a smaller Union force. This was the South's last major victory and Braxton Bragg wasted that final opportunity. Bragg spent the initial aftermath, first refusing to believe he had won, and then engaging in a letter-writing campaign against his subordinate commanders, throwing away the major benefits of the win.

Another fact arguing for a Confederate concentration in 1863 was the evolution of the Union deployment after the summer of 1863. Once Grant concentrated the Union Armies of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio at Chattanooga in October 1863, the window of opportunity for a superior Confederate concentration in the west was closed for ever. By the summer of 1864, the massive Union army before Atlanta had 37% of the total Union field army concentrated in one location.¹⁰⁸ The Army of the Potomac was only slightly smaller at 27%. Thus, the window closed for a more numerous Confederate concentration in October 1863.

Chapter VI. Conclusions.

What lessons can one draw from these case studies in concentration in the Civil War that are relevant today? The criteria this study uses to evaluate concentrations are five: distance, time, combat power, leadership, and purpose. Distance in this case addresses two questions. First, from where are the concentrating troops to come? Obviously, greater distance requires greater transport means and exposes the move to greater risk from enemy action and mishap. The second question addresses the tactical situation that the concentrating troops are in prior to concentrating. It is also important to examine what will be the effect on the enemy of the departure of the concentrating troops? In all the Civil War cases, the Confederates had to wrestle with these issues. Before Shiloh, some troops were obviously being underutilized (e.g. Bragg's) and the decision to send them to Corinth was easy. Others, (e.g. Ruggles troops in Louisiana) seemed underutilized, but their departure left New Orleans almost defenseless and thus opened the way for its fall. In the current strategic situation, the NMS implies that one theater will win decisively before assets are shifted away from it. That explains the emphasis on Decisive Force in the NMS. The only alternative to this is to shift forces before a decision and that calls for apportioning risk.

The second criteria used, time required, is closely related to distance, but goes beyond simply measuring distance. Time in this case has two aspects. How much time is required for the concentration? Once concentrated, how much time will the resulting combat take? This criteria is important for synchronizing operations. Throughout the case studies above, the Confederacy never achieved the Napoleonic goal of concentrating forces, winning a battle or campaign, then shifting forces to another theater for another

battle or campaign. The sole exception was Jackson's movements from the Valley to Richmond to take part in the Seven Days. Modern U.S. strategists have stated this as the goal for "swing forces" in the event of two Major Theaters of War. To achieve this ideal, one must win decisively and quickly, then rapidly switch forces to the next theater and get them into the second campaign. This is easier said than done.

The third criteria is combat power. This addresses the question, "How much is enough?" With the exception of Chickamauga, the Confederates never concentrated enough combat power to achieve their strategic goals. Even in that one case, they concentrated enough combat power, but did so in the wrong theater, or at least under the wrong commander, Braxton Bragg, whom one might describe as the personification of the Clausewitzian concept of 'friction.' Bragg could not take advantage of his battlefield victory, and the benefits won on the field slipped away. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell described the goal of committing overwhelming combat power when the U.S. resorts to force. With scarce resources and competing demands this may be difficult to realize.

Another criteria is leadership. Who is to command the proposed concentration was arguably the most important factor the Confederate authorities faced in the summer of 1863. It would be risky to expend the resources to concentrate in a theater under a commander who is likely not to put the troops to good use. Johnston was a notoriously cautious commander and Bragg's command climate had made his army almost dysfunctional. Of the three main Confederate Commanders, only Lee had a proven record of success in the summer of 1863 and enjoyed the confidence of the President.

Finally, the operational planner must examine the purpose of a concentration. In the

Civil War context, most Confederate concentrations were defensive in purpose. Lee tried to implement offensive ones. Here lies the heart of the tension between the Jominian ideals and that of Archduke Charles. In the pre-war education at West Point, American strategists were suspended between these two poles. Davis, Halleck, and Johnston seemed to tend toward the Archduke Charles positional warfare side, whereas Lee and Beauregard oriented their thinking on the Jominian concentration. In the modern context, maneuver seems to have won the day over positional warfare.

The linkage between national military strategy and the strategic concentration that it supports is still critical. The Confederacy never clearly articulated a national military strategy. After 1st Manassas, some wanted to assume the offensive into Maryland,¹⁰⁹ but this operation was not adopted. President Davis was frequently blamed for this failure to capitalize on momentary northern weakness.¹¹⁰ Davis denies that he forbade an aggressive military strategy,¹¹¹ but he never articulated any policy publicly until after the war. When Lee presented a plan for a strategic concentration in Pennsylvania that might, if successful, win the war, his plan was accepted, but not adequately supported.

Having examined the Confederate strategic situation in the spring of 1863 in light of the above criteria, one must conclude that a Confederate concentration was possible. What is more, it could have been the decisive one of the war. The distances involved in the proposed concentration of troops from East Tennessee and North Carolina were great, but not as great as the Confederate concentration prior to Shiloh (see Appendix 3). The time required for this concentration was also available. Burnside did not move decisively in east Tennessee until August 15 and the Union army in North Carolina did not move at all in 1863. The combat power generated by this concentration would have provided Lee

with a force that outnumbered the Army of the Potomac in Pennsylvania. Given how close the Army of Northern Virginia came to success, one could argue that this additional force would have proved decisive. Lee commanded the Confederacy's most cohesive and effective army in 1863. Finally, the purpose of the Pennsylvania Campaign was to provide the Confederacy with a decisive victory on northern territory. A concentration in Tennessee or Mississippi would have been defensive in nature and not likely to be decisive. According to Lee's estimate, a victory in Pennsylvania would have secured peace on Confederate terms.

The lessons from this case study are still relevant to today's military planners. Both the *National Military Strategy* and the Army's *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* rely on U.S. forces to use the principle of concentration. The U.S. goal of winning decisively relies on the U.S. ability to commit an overwhelming force in one theater of war (or at the operational level of war, theater of operations), win quickly and decisively, then shift forces to another theater. This construct is necessary, due to the U.S. strategic defense requirements and the relative scarcity of defense assets to protect them. The U.S. NMS is an attempt to deal with this strategic situation and relative scarcity, and articulate a strategy takes advantage of the U.S. strengths and mitigates U.S. weaknesses.

There never was a generally accepted statement of Confederate strategy. Thus, the centrifugal forces of Confederate-state politics and departmental command kept pulling away forces that might have proved decisive tactically in the decisive theater. For this sin, more than any other, the Confederacy suffered the death penalty.

Appendices:

1. Timeline
2. Correlation of Forces
3. Comparison of Confederate Concentrations by Man-miles
4. Comparisons of Changes in Orders of Battle Seven Pines-Seven Days and Chancellorsville-Gettysburg.

Appendix 1: Timeline of Significant Events

Event	Dates	Number of troops	Comments or Losses
Farragut's bombardment of Vicksburg	20-27 JUN 62		No losses
Capture of Helena AR	12 JUL 62		
Farragut's 1st passage of Vicksburg (S to N)	25 JUL 62	40 USN [*] Ships	No losses
Farragut's 2nd passage of Vicksburg (N to S)		40 USN Ships	No losses
Holmes' letter to Seddon stating that he cannot send reinforcements across the Mississippi River	5 DEC 62		Holmes ordered to send 10,000 men to Pemberton
Prairie Grove, Ark	7 DEC 62	10,000 US 10,000 CS	Union victory
Movement of Stevenson's Division from AOT to Vicksburg	24 DEC 62	Ca. 8,000	
Chickasaw Bluffs	27-29 DEC 62	30,720 US [†] 13,792 CS	1,776 US 207 CS [†]
Stone's River	31 DEC 62 - 2 JAN 63	41,400 US 34,739 CS	12,906 US 11,739 CS
McClermand takes Confederate fort at Arkansas Post	4-12 JAN 63	28,944 US 4,900 CS	1,061 US 4,900 CS
<i>USS Queen of the West</i> , <i>USS De Soto</i> , and scow run past Vicksburg	10 FEB 63	-	No losses to CS gunfire. <i>USS Queen of the West</i> later captured [§]
<i>USS Indianola</i> runs past Vicksburg		-	<i>USS Indianola</i> later rammed & captured
Burnside's Corps sent to KY	19 MAR 63	15,000	
Steele's Bayou Expedition	17-21 MAR 63		
Foote's 1 st Passage by Vicksburg	16 APR 63	12 US ships	1 US ship
Foote's 2 nd Passage by Vicksburg	19 APR 63	6 US ships, 12 barges	1 ship, 6 barges
Bombardment of Grand Gulf	29 APR		Foote bombards
Grant lands at Bruinsburg	30 APR		Grant lands unopposed

^{*} B & L, vol. 2, pg. 73, and vol. 3, pg. 554.

[†] Boatner, pg. 154.

[‡] Boatner (citing Livermore), pg. 154.

[§] Robert L. Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1972), pg. 29.

Battle of Chancellorsville	1-4 MAY 63	133,868 US 60,892 CS	17,278 US 12,821 CS
Joe Johnston arrives at Jackson Mississippi to assume command in that state. Sends Seddon a telegram stating, "I am to late."	9 MAY 63		
Lee writes to Seddon questioning "application" of troops sent to Mississippi.	11 MAY 63		
Battle of Jackson	14 MAY 63	20,000 US ? 6,000 CS	
Champion's Hill	16 MAY 63	29,000 US 20,000 CS	2,441 US 3851 CS
Big Black River	17 MAY 63	10,000 US 4,000 CS	- 1,700 CS
Vicksburg Siege started	19 MAY 63		
Davis' and Pettigrew's brigades sent from Department of North Carolina to the Army of Northern Virginia	25 MAY 63	7,000	
Second Battle of Winchester, Virginia	17 JUN 63	6,000 US 17,000 CS	4,443 US 269 CS**
Tullahoma Campaign	23-30 JUN 63	65,000 US 44,000 CS	- -
Sander's Raid on Knoxville	14-23 JUN 63		
Battle of Gettysburg	1-3 JUL 63	88,289 US 75,000 CS	23,049 US 28,063 CS††
Vicksburg surrenders	4 JUL 63		30,000 CS
Price's attack on Helena AR	4 JUL 63	4,000 US 6,500 CS	239 US 1,600 CS
Port Hudson surrenders	8 JUL 63	18,000 US 7,200 CS	3,000 US 7,200 CS‡‡
Burnside's Knoxville Campaign	15 AUG 63		Holston Riv. Bridge (1,600 ft) burned
Burnside occupies Knoxville	6 SEP 63		
Bragg abandons Chattanooga	6 SEP 63		
Aborted Battle of McLemore's Cove	10 SEP 63		

** Boatner, pg. 937.


†† Boatner, pg. 339.

‡‡ Boatner, pg. 663.

Longstreet's Corps sent to the Army of Tennessee	12,000 CS		
Battle of Chickamauga	19-20 SEP 63	58,222 US 66,326 CS	16,170 US 18,454 CS ^{§§}
Grant brings Union Armies of the Tennessee and Ohio to Chattanooga to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland			

^{§§} Boatner, 152.

Appendix 2: Correlation of Forces



*Union soldiers/100 Confederate soldiers

Appendix 3: Comparison of Concentrations by Man-Miles

Campaign	Dates	Command	Men	Miles	Man-Miles
Shiloh	28 FEB 62	Ruggles	5,000	400 rail 100 foot	2M
	7 MAR	Bragg	10,000	500 rail	5M
	24 MAR	A. S. Johnston	17,000	200 rail	3.4M
	24 MAR	Polk	8,000	200 rail	1.6M
<i>Total Shiloh</i>					<i>12 Million</i>
Seven Days	26 JUN 62	Jackson	17,000	100 rail/foot	1.7M
		Lawton	2,400	550	1.32M
		Ripley's Bde	2,366	500	1.18M
		T. H. Holmes	7,000	100 foot/rail	.7M
<i>Total Seven Days</i>					<i>4.9 Million</i>
Proposed Pre-Pennsylvania	May 1863	East Tenn.	5,000	300 foot/rail	1.5M
		NC	15,000	450 rail	6.75M
<i>Total (proposed concentration in preparation for Pennsylvania)</i>					<i>8.25 Million</i>

Appendix 4: Comparison of Confederate Forces Seven Pines/Seven Days and Chancellorsville/Gettysburg
Seven Pines and Seven Days

Seven Pines[!] Joe Johnston	Seven Days R. E. Lee
	<i>Longstreet's Command</i>
Longstreet's Division	Longstreet's Division
Kemper's Brigade	Kemper's Brigade
Dick Anderson's Brigade	Dick Anderson's Brigade
Pickett's Brigade	Pickett's Brigade
Wilcox's Brigade	Wilcox's Brigade
Colston's Brigade	Featherston's Brigade
Pryor's Brigade	Pryor's Brigade
Huger's Division	Huger's Division
Armistead's Brigade	Armistead's Brigade
Mahone's Brigade	Mahone's Brigade
Blanchard's Brigade	Wright's Brigade
	Ransom's Brigade (of Holmes' Division)
	Holmes's Division
	Daniel's Brigade
	Walker's Brigade
	A.P. Hill's Division
	Field's Brigade
	Gregg's Brigade
	Joseph Anderson's Brigade
	Branch's Brigade
	Archer's Brigade
	Pender's Brigade
	<i>Jackson's Command</i>
G. W. Smith	Whiting's Division
Whiting's Brigade	
Hood's Brigade	Hood's Brigade
Hampton's Brigade	Law's Brigade
Hatton's Brigade	
Pettigrew's Brigade	
	Jackson's Division
	Stonewall Brigade
	Cunningham's Brigade
	Fulkerson's Brigade
	Lawton's Brigade
	Ewell's Division
	Elzey's Brigade
	Trimble's Brigade
	Taylor's Brigade
D. H. Hill's Division	D. H. Hill's Division
Garland's Brigade	Garland's Brigade
Rodes' Brigade	Rodes' Brigade
Rains' Brigade	Ripley's Brigade
G. B. Anderson's Brigade	G. B. Anderson's Brigade
	Colquitt's Brigade
	<i>Magruder's Command</i>

Jones' Division (not engaged at Seven Pines)	Jones' Division
Toombs' Brigade	Toombs' Brigade
G.T. Anderson's Brigade	G.T. Anderson's Brigade
McLaw's Division (not engaged at Seven Pines)	McLaw's Division
Semmes's Brigade	Semmes's Brigade
Kershaw's Brigade	Kershaw's Brigade
Magruder's Division (not engaged at Seven Pines)	Magruder's Division
Cobb's Brigade	Cobb's Brigade
Griffith's Brigade	Griffith's Brigade

Appendix 4: Order of Battle Comparison Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

Chancellorsville Order Of Battle (ANV)	Gettysburg Order Of Battle (ANV)
General Robert E. Lee, Commanding Reserve Artillery. BG William N. Pendleton.	Army Of Northern Virginia - General Robert E. Lee Artillery - BG W. N. Pendleton
First Corps.	First Army Corps - Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet
McLaws' Division. MG Lafayette McLaws.	McLaws' Division - MG Lafayette McLaws
Wofford's Brigade. BG W. T. Wofford.	Wofford's Brigade - BG W. T. Wofford
Semmes' Brigade. BG Paul J. Semmes.	Semmes' Bde - BG P. J. Semmes; COL G. Bryan
Kershaw's Brigade. BG Joseph B. Kershaw.	Kershaw's Brigade - BG J. B. Kershaw
Barksdale's Brigade. BG William Barksdale	Barksdale's Brigade - BG W. Barksdale; COL B. G. Humphreys
Artillery. COL H. C. Cabell.	Artillery - COL H. C. Cabell
<i>In Southside Virginia during Chancellorsville</i>	Pickett's Division - MG George E. Pickett
	Garnett's Brigade - BG R. B. Garnett; MAJ C. S.
	Kemper's Brigade - BG J. L. Kemper; COL Joseph Mayo, Jr.
	Armistead's Brigade - BG L. A. Armistead; COL W. R. Aylett
	Artillery - MAJ James Dearing
<i>In Southside Virginia during Chancellorsville</i>	Hood's Division - MG John B. Hood
	Law's Brigade - BG E. M. Law; COL James L. Sheffield
	Robertson's Brigade - BG J. B. Robertson
	Anderson's Brigade - BG George T. Anderson; LTC William Luffman
	Benning's Brigade - BG Henry L. Benning
	Artillery - MAJ M. W. Henry
Artillery Reserve	Artillery Reserve - COL J. B. Walton
Alexander's Battalion. COL E. P. Alexander.	Alexander's Battalion - COL E. P. Alexander
Washington (La.) Artillery. COL J. B. Walton.	Washington (La) Artillery - MAJ B. F. Eshleman

Second Corps. (1) LTG Thomas J. Jackson.	Second Army Corps - LTG Richard S. Ewell
Early's Division. MG Jubal A. Early	Early's Division - MG Jubal A. Early
Hays' Brigade. BG Harry T. Hays.	Hays' Brigade - BG Harry T. Hays
Smith's Brigade. BG William Smith.	Smith's Brigade - BG William Smith
Hoke's Brigade. BG Robert F. Hoke.	Hoke's Brigade - COL Isaac E. Avery; COL A. C. Godwin
Gordon's Brigade. BG John B. Gordon.	Gordon's Brigade - BG J. B. Gordon
Artillery. LTC H. P. JONES.	Artillery - LTC H. P. Jones
Trimble's Division. BG R. E. Colston.	Johnson's Division - MG Edward Johnson
Colston's (3 rd) Brigade. (1) COL E. T. H. Warren.	Steuart's Brigade - BG George H. Steuart
Paxton's (Stonewall) Brigade.	Stonewall Brigade - BG James A. Walker
Nicholls' (Fourth) Brigade. (1) BG F. T. Nicholls.	Nicholls Brigade* - COL J. M. Williams
Jones' (Second) Brigade. (1) BG J. R. Jones.	Jones' Brigade - BG John M. Jones;
Artillery Reserve. LTC R. S. Andrews.	Artillery - MAJ J. W. Latimer;
D. H. Hill's Division. (1) BG R. E. Rodes.	Rodes' Division - MG R. E. Rodes
Colquitt's Brigade. BG A. H. Colquitt.	<i>Detached after Chancellorsville, & sent to NC***</i>

*** (O.R. XVIII, pg. 1085.)

<i>Serving in Department of NC until May 1863.</i>	Daniel's Brigade - BG Junius Daniel
Doles' Brigade. BG George Doles.	Doles' Brigade - BG George Doles
Iverson's Brigade. BG Alfred Iverson.	Iverson's Brigade - BG Alfred Iverson
Ramseur's Brigade. (1) BG S. D. Ramseur.	Ramseur's Brigade - BG S. D. Ramseur
Rodes' Brigade. (1) BG R. E. Rodes.	O'Neal's Brigade - COL E. A. O'Neal
Artillery. LTC T. H. CARTER.	Artillery - LTC Thomas H. Carter
Col S. Crutchfield.	Artillery Reserve -
Brown's Battalion COL J. T. BROWN.	COL J. Thompson Brown
Nelson's Battalion. LTC W. Nelson.	Nelson's Battalion.

	Third Army Corps - LTG A. P. Hill
Anderson's Division. MG Richard H. Anderson.	Anderson's Division - MG R. H. Anderson
Wilcox's Brigade. BG C. M. Wilcox.	Wilcox's Brigade - BG Cadmus M. Wilcox
Wright's Brigade. BG A. R. Wright.	Wright's Brigade - BG A. R. Wright;
Mahone's Brigade. BG William Mahone.	Mahone's Brigade - BG William Mahone
Perry's Brigade. BG E. A. Perry.	Perry's Brigade - COL David Lang
Posey's Brigade. BG Carnot Posey.	Posey's Brigade - BG Carnot Posey
Sumter (Ga.) Battalion. LTC A. S. Cutts	Artillery (Sumter Battalion) - MAJ John Lane
Hill's Division. MG A. P. Hill.	Heth's Division - MG Henry Heth;
<i>Serving in Dept. of NC until May 1863. ^{†††}</i>	First Brigade - BG J. J. Pettigrew;
Heth's Brigade. (1) BG Henry Heth.	Second Brigade - COL J. M. Brockenbrough
Archer's (Fifth) Brigade. (1) BG J. J. Archer	Third Brigade - BG James J. Archer;
<i>Serving in Dept. of NC until May 1863. ^{†††}</i>	Fourth Brigade - BG Joseph R. Davis
Artillery. LTC J. J. Garnett.	Artillery - LTC John J. Garnett
	Pender's Division - MG William D. Pender;
McGowan's Brigade. (1) BG S. McGown.	First Brigade - COL Abner Perrin
Lane's (Fourth) Brigade. BG J. H. Lane.	Second Brigade - BG James H. Lane
Thomas' Brigade. BG E. L. Thomas.	Third Brigade - BG Edward L. Thomas
Pender's Brigade. BG W. D. Pender.	Fourth Brigade - BG A. M. Scales;
	Artillery - MAJ William T. Poague
Artillery. COL R. L. WALKER.	Artillery Reserve - COL R. Lindsay Walker
McIntosh's Battalion. MAJ D. G. McIntosh.	McIntosh's Battalion - MAJ D. G. McIntosh
Pegram's Battalion	Pegram's Battalion - MAJ W. J. Pegram;
Cavalry. MG James E. B. Stuart	Cavalry Stuart's Division - MG J. E. B. Stuart
First Brigade. BG Wade Hampton.	Hampton's Brigade - BG Wade Hampton;
Second Brigade. BG Fitzhugh Lee.	Fitz. Lee's Brigade - BG Fitz. Lee
	Robertson's Brigade - BG Beverly H. Robertson
Third Brigade. BG W. H. F. Lee.	W. H. F. Lee's Brigade - COL J. R. Chambliss, Jr.
Fourth Brigade. BG William E. Jones.	Jenkins' Brigade - BG A. G. Jenkins;
Horse Artillery. MAJ R. F. Beckham.	Stuart Horse Artillery - MAJ R. F. Beckham
	Imboden's Command - BG J. D. Imboden

^{†††} Walter Clark, *North Carolina Regiments*, (Wendell, NC: Broadfoot, 1982), Volume 3, pp. 88 & 234.

^{†††} Walter Clark, *North Carolina Regiments*, (Wendell, NC: Broadfoot, 1982), Volume 3, pg. 294.

Endnotes

¹ *Southern Historical Society Papers* (hereinafter called *S.H.S.P.*), Volume 3, pg. 34.

² The Joint Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, pg. 3.

³ The Joint Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, pg. 4.

⁴ The Joint Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, pg. 6.

⁵ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998, pg. 285.

⁶ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, pg. III-9.

⁷ The Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pg. 6-7.

⁸ The Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pg. 2-4.

⁹ The Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pg. 2-4.

¹⁰ Antoine-Henri de Jomini, *Les Guerres de la Révolution (1792-1797)*, Paris: Hachettes, 1998), pg. 394.

¹¹ Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, *The Politics of Command*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pg. 28.

¹² Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1967), pg. 105.

¹³ Weigley, *op. cit.*, pg. 106.

¹⁴ Weigley, *op. cit.*, pg. 150.

¹⁵ Connelly and Jones, *op. cit.* pg. 25.

¹⁶ John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens nor Sparta?* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), pg. 24.

¹⁷ Weigley, pg. 30.

¹⁸ Mark M. Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994), pg. 522.

¹⁹ Weigley, *op. cit.*, pg. 30, 47, 49, 138.

²⁰ William C. Davis, *Jefferson Davis: The Man and his Hour*, pg. 232.

²¹ John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986), pg. 149.

²² Jefferson Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, (New York: Da Capo, 1990), volume 1, pg. 283.

²³ Richard Berringer and others, *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 9.

²⁴ Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 35.

²⁵ Gary W. Gallagher, *The Confederate War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 31.

²⁶ Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pg. 9.

²⁷ William C. Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pg. 232.

²⁸ U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies* (hereinafter cited as *O.R.*), (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1901), Series IV, Volume 1, pg. 823.

²⁹ *O.R.* Volume XI, Part 3, pg. 314.

³⁰ William C. Davis, *Jefferson Davis*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pg. 319. Also, Richard Current, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, volume 4, pg. 1678. Davis critics are ubiquitous, but in this case, Walker's lack of any prior military experience would support the assertion that he was chosen because he would support whatever strategic policies Davis came up with.

³¹ Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pg. 64. It should be noted, however, that Jefferson Davis, in his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, volume 1, pg. 387 states that he came to the 1 October 1861 conference with Johnston and Beauregard with diagrams drawn by Col. Claudius Crozet, late of Napoleon's Army, of the Falls of the Potomac. Davis says that he fully expected an advance into Maryland and brought the diagrams to assist in planning that offensive north of the Potomac. G. F. R. Henderson in his *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, relates an anecdote from Gustavus W. Smith to the effect that Davis had refused to allow an offensive north of the Potomac. It is this author's opinion that Davis did not veto an offensive north of the Potomac, neither did he issue peremptory orders that the offensive should be undertaken. In the absence of such orders, Johnston, whose salient personality characteristic was reluctance to undertake any offensive action unless forced to, was unlikely to launch any Maryland offensive in October 1861 unless directly ordered to do so.

³² Thomas Connelly, *Army of the Heartland*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pg. 63.

³³ Thomas L. Connelly and Archer Jones, *The Politics of Command*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pg. 95.

³⁴ Thomas Connelly, *Army of the Heartland*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pg. 130.

³⁵ *O.R.* VII, pg. 900.

³⁶ *O.R.* VI, pg. 823.

³⁷ *O.R.* VI, pg. 828.

³⁸ *O.R.* VII, pg. 900.

³⁹ *O.R.* VI, pg. 825.

⁴⁰ *O.R.* VII, pg. 900.

⁴¹ *O.R.* X, Part 2, pg. 354.

⁴² *O.R.* X, Part 1, pg. 398.

⁴³ *O.R.* X, Part 1, pg. 112. Note that this figure includes BG Lew Wallace's Division

which was in the area, but did not take part in the fighting on 6 April. If BG Lew Wallace's Division is subtracted, Grant had 37,331 in the vicinity of Shiloh Church on 6 April, 1862.

⁴⁴ P. G. T. Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1988, Volume 1, pg. 579.

⁴⁵ Thomas L. Snead, "With Price East of the Mississippi," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1988, Volume 2, pg. 717.

⁴⁶ P. G. T. Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1988, part 1, pg. 578.

⁴⁷ Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations* (Narrative hereinafter), (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pg. 113.

⁴⁸ Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pg. 113.

⁴⁹ *O.R.* Volume XI, part 3, pg. 469.

⁵⁰ Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pg. 128.

⁵¹ Johnston's *Narrative*, pg. 116.

⁵² Jefferson Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, (New York: Da Capo, 1990), volume 1, pg. 387

⁵³ *O.R.* XI, Part 3, pg. 531. Confederate forces consisted of around 62,000 if one includes Huger's Division, but Johnston did not include them.

⁵⁴ *O.R.* XI, Part 3, pg. 204.

⁵⁵ Stephen W. Sears, *To the Gates of Richmond*, (New York, Tichnor & Fields, 1992), pg. 157.

⁵⁶ Sears, *op. cit.*, pg. 195.

⁵⁷ Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, Volume 1, pp. 605-632. The exposed deficiencies of several officers led to their transfer from the Army of Northern Virginia to other departments or out of the service. Foremost among these were Magruder (transfer to the Trans-Mississippi), Holmes (transfer to Trans-Mississippi), Huger (relief and transfer to the West), D. H. Hill (transfer to NC), and G. W. Smith (resignation from Confederate service).

⁵⁸ Sears, *op. cit.* pg. 339. Confederate States Secretary of the Navy to his wife after the end of the Seven Days. The unassailable position, and the presence of abundant Union artillery and especially the gunboats had dissuaded Lee from attempting any serious attack at Harrison's Landing on 2 July, 1862.

⁵⁹ *O.R.* XI, Part 3, pg. 291. Indeed, McClellan informed Secretary of War Stanton that he had to have over 100,000 more men as reinforcements in order to try again to take Richmond.

⁶⁰ Lee's After Action Report, *O.R.* XI, Part 2, pg. 498.

⁶¹ Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, volume 1, pp. 605 - 632. Lee was the most successful Confederate commander at eliminating inefficient commanders from his ranks. The performance of his army, in no small measure, is a reflection of this.

⁶² G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, (Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1989), Volume 2, pg. 398.

⁶³ O.R., Volume XIV, pg. 955.

⁶⁴ SHSP, Volume 1, pg. 462.

⁶⁵ S.H.S.P., Volume 9, pg. 513.

⁶⁶ Substitution was the practice of providing one's replacement for service in the army. In theory this would allow someone to stay out of the army. In practice, this practice was abused by the wealthy, leading to the cry of "Rich man's war, poor man's fight" and the societal dissension associated with this idea. Richard Current, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), volume 1, pg. 397.

⁶⁷ Richard Current, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), volume 1, pg. 398.

⁶⁸ Mark Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, pg. 245.

⁶⁹ Donald Dale Jackson and the Editors of Time-Life Books, *Twenty Million Yankees*, (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1985), pg. 93

⁷⁰ O.R. Series 3, Volume 2, pg. 957; Volume 3, 460; Series 4, Volume 1, pp. 1176, 185; Volume 2, pp. 278, 615. It must be noted that other sources use other figures than the above. The author chose the Official Records because the methodology for counting soldiers was the same between the two sides and uniform throughout the war, making comparison easiest and most reliable. See appendix 1 for a side by side comparison of the aggregate army strengths over time.

⁷¹ O.R. Volume XXV, Part 2, pg. 180.

⁷² O.R. Volume XXIV, Part 3, pg. 163. Hurlbut's XVI Corps has 62,617 present for duty. These were spread over western Tennessee and southwestern Kentucky. The balance of Grant's Army was within supporting distance in and around Milliken's Bend, Lake Providence, and Young's Point.

⁷³ O.R. Volume 25, Part 2, pg. 180; Volume 25, Part 2, pg. 320; Volume 14, pg. 434; Volume 18, pg. 574; Volume 22, Part 2, pg. 189; Volume 25, Part 2, pg. 181; Volume 25, Part 2, pg. 184; Volume 23, Part 2, pg. 198; Volume 20, Part 2, pg. 314; Volume 23, Part 2, pg. 197; Volume 17, Part 2, pg. 578; Volume 24, Part 3, pg. 21; Volume 24, Part 3, pg. 75; Volume 24, Part 3, pg. 163; Volume 27, Part 3, pg. 818; Volume 26, Part 1, pg. 528; Volume 27, Part 3, pg. 243; Volume 27, Part 3, pg. 244; Volume 26, Part 1, pg. 612; Volume 27, Part 1, pg. 2; Volume 27, Part 3, pg. 450 continued; Volume 18, pg. 547; Volume 18, pg. 678.

⁷⁴ O.R. XXIV, Part 3, pg. 767.

⁷⁵ O.R. XX, Part 2, pg. 453, and O.R. XX, Part 1, pg. 663.

⁷⁶ Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, (NY: Scribner & Sons, 1934), volume 2, pg. 231

⁷⁷ O.R. XIV, pg. 955.

⁷⁸ O.R. XXIV, Part 1, pg. 197. Another reason the Department of East Tennessee may have been created was to protect the vital Virginia and Tennessee Railroad from east Tennessee Unionist guerillas. The Department, however, probably created more harm than good by defeated Confederate unity of effort in Tennessee.

⁷⁹ Thomas Connelly, *Army of the Heartland*, (Baton Rouge, LSU Press, 1967), pg. 277. Indeed, Connelly lays much of the blame for the failure of the 1862 Kentucky invasion squarely on faulty command structure and personality conflict between Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith. This argument has merit. Certainly President Davis bears some

blame for allowing one department commander to operate in another's department without designating a senior commander.

⁸⁰ *O.R.* XXIV, Part 1, pg. 197. A somewhat exasperated Jefferson Davis wrote to his old friend Braxton Bragg in June 1863, "The arrangement made of several departments in a geographical district, to the command of which General Johnston was assigned, was intended to secure the fullest co-operation of the troops in those departments, and at the same time to avoid delay by putting the commander of each department in direct correspondence with the War Office." One can almost read between the lines, "Come one folks, we've been over this before."

⁸¹ *O.R.* XXIII, Part 2, pg. 147.

⁸² *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 689.

⁸³ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 720.

⁸⁴ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 720, and 842.

⁸⁵ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 790.

⁸⁶ Interview with author and professor Steven Woodworth, March 28, 2000. Woodworth, the author of *Davis and Lee at War*, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press: 1995) believes that Lee may have been implying that the weather was not the only thing that would have made him doubt Pickett's "application" upon arriving in Mississippi. Lee may have been hinting that Johnston and Pemberton were less than likely to put the division to good use. Unfortunately for future historiography, Lee was notoriously reluctant to criticize other officers in writing, especially a friend like Joe Johnston.

⁸⁷ *O.R.* XXIV, Part 1, pg. 197.

⁸⁸ Between 25 JUL 62 and 19 APR 63, 90 US Navy ships and 12 barges ran down the Mississippi River past the guns at Vicksburg. The Navy lost 2 ships and 6 barges doing this, 4% of the ships and 50% of the barges. Thus, while Vicksburg was effective at closing the River to northern commerce, it was ineffective at stopping Union naval movements past the guns. Vicksburg's value to the Confederacy was, thus a negative one, it's retention held little positive benefits to the Confederacy. James Russell Soley, "Naval Operations in the Vicksburg Campaign," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, (Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books, 1988), Volume 2, pg. 554. Robert L. Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1972), pg. 29.

⁸⁹ *O.R.* XXIV, Part 3, pg. 498.

⁹⁰ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 713.

⁹¹ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 790.

⁹² *O.R.* XVIII, pg. 944, *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 686-7, *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 724-5.

⁹³ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 714.

⁹⁴ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 792.

⁹⁵ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 881.

⁹⁶ Armistead Lindsay Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, (Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1983), pg. 269.

⁹⁷ *S.H.S.P.*, volume 4, pg. 153.

⁹⁸ Davis, *op. cit.*, volume 2, pg. 367.

⁹⁹ *O.R.* XVIII, pg. 895.

¹⁰⁰ Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, Dallas: SMU Press, 1973), pp. 116

& 119.

¹⁰¹ *O.R.* XXV, Part 2, pg. 735

¹⁰² *O.R.* XVIII, pg. 1075. In rather blunt terms Daniel Harvey Hill, Commander of the Department of North Carolina declined Lee's offer of Beverly Robertson, stating "Robertson has been once in this department" as if that said all that needed saying. Robertson had had run-ins with Jackson the previous fall over the inefficiency of Robertson's NC Cavalry Brigade. In the end, Robertson accompanied Lee to Gettysburg.

¹⁰³ Lee to John B. Hood May 21, 1863, from Clifford Dowdey, *The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee*, (Boston: Brown, Little, and Co. 1961), pg. 490.

¹⁰⁴ A. L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, (Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1983), pp. 265-6. General Long's assessment is hardly unbiased, but his words are echoed in several other sources and are used here as representative of the emotions in the Army of Northern Virginia in that spring.

¹⁰⁵ Brigadier General Francis Barlow, Division Commander in the XIth Corps and Captain Charles Francis Adams of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, in Edwin Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, (NY: Scribner's and Sons, 1968), pg. 24.

¹⁰⁶ *O.R.* XVIII, pg. 678. D. H. Hill asserted on May 27, 1863, (*O.R.* XVIII, pg. 1073.) that the Union had thirty-one regiments in New Berne. In fact the Union return for April 30 (*O.R.* XVIII, pg. 678) shows 16,785 men among thirty-nine regiments and five batteries.

¹⁰⁷ *O.R.* XXIII, Part 2, pg. 856. Dabney Maury, the Commander of the Department of East Tennessee before Buckner took command, stated on May 4, 1863, that he had 7,789 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (*O.R.* XXIII, Part 1, pg. 311), but these totals include only rank and file, not "aggregate present and absent," which was over 10,000. Buckner's report does not list exactly how he had arrayed these forces. The same reasons that delayed Rosecrans' advance into the Tullahoma region also delayed Burnside's advance into East Tennessee. (i.e. lack of forage). Burnside, however, did not have the luxury of a railroad over which to draw his supplies. As events played out, Burnside did not succeed in getting any forces into East Tennessee until late June and any permanent presence until 15 August.

¹⁰⁸ *O.R.*, Series 3, Volume IV, pg. 465.

¹⁰⁹ Jackson and Joe Johnston foremost among them. Henderson, *op. cit.* volume 1, pg. 176, and Johnston, *op. cit.* pg. 63-64. Johnston's post-war claim that he wanted to take the offensive should be viewed with skepticism, however. He was engaged in a running literary battle with Davis over their respective reputations and fixing the blame for Confederate defeat.

¹¹⁰ Joe Johnston, *op. cit.*, pg. 64.

¹¹¹ Davis, *op. cit.*, volume 1, pg. 387.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Articles

Marino, Michael. "Attack and Destroy: Lee, Napoleon and the Civil War," *Columbiad*, Volume 3, Number 4, Winter 2000, 15 - 20.

Gabel, Christopher R. "Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy," Combat Studies Institute Pamphlet, 1999.

Robertson, William Glenn. "Railroads in the Chickamauga Campaign," *Civil War*, November-December, 1991, 50 - 71.

Compilations

Evans, Clement A. ed. *Confederate Military History*, 12 Volumes, Carmel, IN: Guild Press of Indiana, 1997.

The Southern Historical Society, *The Southern Historical Society Papers*, Richmond: 1876-1944.

Books and Monographs

North with Lee and Jackson

Beringer, Richard E., Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr. *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Boatner, Mark M. *The Civil War Dictionary*, New York: McKay, 1988.

Boatner, Mark M. *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1994.

Chesnut, Mary Boykin. *A Diary from Dixie*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949.

Clark, John E. "To Strain Every Energy" *Civil War Railroads: A Comparison of Union and Confederate War Management*, Ann Arbor: Bell & Howell Information Company, 1997. Princeton: Princeton University, 1997.

Clark, Walter, (Ed). *North Carolina Regiments*, Wendell, NC: Broadfoot Publishing, 1982, Volume 1-5.

Connelly, Thomas L. *Army of the Heartland*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.

Connelly, Thomas L. *Autumn of Glory*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971.

Connelly, Thomas L. And Archer Jones. *The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971.

Connelly, Thomas L. *The Marble Man*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.

Current, Richard N. ed., *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*, 4 Vol., New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.

Davis, Jefferson, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, 2 Volumes, New York, Da Capo Press, 1990.

Davis, William C. *Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour*, Louisiana State University Press, 1991.

Davis, William C. *A Government of Their Own*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994.

Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993.

Dowdley, Clifford, ed. *Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee*, Boston, Brown and Sons: 1961.

Early, Jubal Anderson. *Jubal Early's Memoirs*, Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1989.

Eiserman, Frederick A. *Longstreet's Corps at Chickamauga: Lessons in Inter-Theater Deployment*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1985

Freeman, Douglas. *Lee's Lieutenants*, 3 Volumes, New York: Scribner and Sons, 1940-1944.

Freeman, Douglas. *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, 4 Volumes, New York: Scribner and Sons, 1934-1944

Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones, *How the North Won*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983.

Henderson, G. F. R. *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1989.

Gallagher, Gary W. *The Confederate War*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1997.

Johnston Joseph E. *Narrative on Military Operations*, New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969.

Jomini, Antoine-Henri. *Les Guerres de la Révolution*, Paris, Hachettes Littérature, 1998.

Joint Staff, *National Military Strategy*, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1997.

Kerby, Robert L. *Kirby Smith's Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South 1863-1865*, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1972.

Lovell, John P. *Neither Athens nor Sparta?* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979.

McMurry, Richard M., *Two Great Rebel Armies*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

Millis, Walter. *Arms and Men*, New York: Putnam & Sons, 1956.

Paret, Peter. Ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Sears, Stephen W. *To the Gates of Richmond*, New York, Tichnor and Fields, 1992.

Thomas, Emory M. *Robert E. Lee*, New York, Norton and Co., 1995.

Thomas, Emory M. *The Confederacy as Revolutionary Experience*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss-Hall, 1971.

U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 parts in 70 volumes and Atlas, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.

Weigley, Russell F. *History of the United States Army*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967.

Woodruff, Steven E. *Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The American Civil War in the West*, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1987.

Woodward, Bob. *The Commanders*, NY: ? Publishing, 1994.

as of: 301615 APR 00